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The Procedural Due Process Requirements for No-Fly 
Lists 
SOUMYA PANDA∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Imagine arriving at the airport and checking in at the ticketing booth.  
You tell the ticketing agent your name, your flight number, and show the 
agent your identification.  The agent enters the information into the termi-
nal and a look of shock appears on his or her face.  While other passengers 
are waiting behind you, the agent calls for security and mentions in front of 
other passengers that you are denied from boarding the plane.  Now imag-
ine that you are a famous United States senator arriving from a political 
convention and the ticketing agent tells you that you cannot board a plane 
because your name appears in a database.1  Or imagine that you are an 
ACLU lawyer who spoke at a conference concerning terrorism and are 
denied boarding because your name appears in a database.2  Or imagine 
that you are a former pop star singer who converted to Islam and are de-
nied boarding a plane.  Whether you are a leisure traveler, a political fig-
urehead, a professional business traveler, or popular figure in society, the 
security measures for air travel in this post 9/11 era affect everyone. 
In response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the United States increased security 
measures within its borders for air travel.  One such security measure de-
nies any person the United States Government considers a flight risk from 
boarding an airplane.3  The first time passengers are told that they cannot 
board a plane occurs after they have already purchased a ticket and are 
attempting to check in.  Furthermore, a ticketing agent does not inform 
  
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2006, Franklin Pierce Law Center – Concord, N.H.; M.S. Electrical Engineer-
ing, 2003, University of Colorado – Boulder, CO; B.S. Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2001, 
University of Colorado –  Boulder, CO. 
 1. Senator Ted Kennedy was denied boarding because the name “T. Kennedy” appeared in the 
database.  Senator Kennedy’s staff attempted to clarify the situation with the Department of Homeland 
Security, but the situation was not rectified until Senator Kennedy was denied boarding an additional 
three times.  Sara Kehaulani Goo, Sen. Kennedy Flagged by No-Fly List, Washington Post A03 (Aug. 
20, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17073-2004Aug19.html (accessed Sep-
tember 29, 2005). 
 2. Dave Lindorf, The No Fly List: Is a federal agency systematically harassing travelers for their 
political beliefs?, http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/27/02/feature3.shtml (accessed September 29, 
2005). 
 3. 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
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passengers why they cannot board the plane or why they are subject to 
additional searches prior to boarding the plane.  Passengers often face hu-
miliation when a ticketing agent announces aloud that they cannot board a 
plane or subjects the passenger to additional searches in front of other pas-
sengers.4  Common questions that arise are: (1) who generates the list?; (2) 
what is the authority for generating the list?; (3) what is the criteria for 
putting passengers on the list?; (4) who has access to the list?; and (5) how 
do passengers challenge their name on the list? 
This article will focus on why placing an individual’s name on a No-
Fly or Selectee List without prior notice or a hearing is a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.  Part II will provide a general 
background of the Transportation Security Administration and the 
agency’s authority to generate the No-Fly and the Selectee Lists.  Part III 
will focus on why placing passengers on one of the lists deprives them of 
their right to interstate travel and reputation sufficient to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process clause.  Part IV will discuss why passengers are 
entitled to notice and a hearing prior to placement of their names on the 
lists and the requirements for a constitutionally adequate hearing. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, Congress created the Transportation Security Administration 
(“TSA”) on November 19, 2001.5  The head of the TSA is the Under Sec-
retary of Transportation for Security.6  The primary function of the Under 
Secretary (“Secretary”) is to oversee and carry out security measures for 
modes of transportation exercised by the Department of Transportation.7 
Part A will discuss the statutory authority of the Secretary.  Part B will 
discuss the documents that the Electronic Privacy Information Center ob-
tained from the TSA.  Part C will discuss affidavits the TSA submitted in a 
lawsuit filed by a listed passenger.  Finally, Part D will discuss the consti-
tutional implications of listing passengers.  
  
 4. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Passenger Complaints, http://www.epic.org/foia_docs/ 
airtravel/congress1.pdf (accessed September 29, 2005). 
 5. 49 U.S.C. § 114. 
 6. Id. at § 114(b). 
 7. Id. at § 114(d)(2). 
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A. Statutory Authority of the Secretary 
The Secretary has no explicit statutory authority to create a No-Fly or a 
Selectee List.8  The Secretary’s authority to manage security threats, how-
ever, is quite broad.  For example, the Secretary’s security duties include 
carrying out actions he or she considers necessary to the extent authorized 
by law,9 which allows him or her to “issue, rescind, and revise such regula-
tions . . . necessary to carry out the functions of the Administration.”10  
Furthermore, the Secretary is authorized to oversee security measures im-
plemented at airports,11 which include overseeing screening12 and deter-
mining threats to civil aviation.13  If the Secretary determines that an order 
must be issued immediately,14 then he or she has authority to issue the or-
der without providing notice.15    
Furthermore, the Secretary has broad authority to identify passengers 
who pose a threat to transportation and to prevent them from boarding an 
aircraft.16  For example, the Secretary is responsible for establishing proce-
dures for notifying the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (“FAA”), state and local law enforcement officials, and airport or air-
line security officers of “individuals known to pose, or suspected of pos-
ing, a risk of . . .  terrorism or a threat to airline passenger safety.”17  More-
over, the Secretary may require air carriers “to use information from gov-
ernment agencies to identify individuals on passenger lists who may be a 
threat to civil aviation,”18 and to prevent such individuals from boarding 
the aircraft.19   
  
 8. See id. at § 114 (no explicit mention of authority to create a No-Fly or Selectee List). 
 9. Id. at § 114(f)(15). 
 10. Id. at § 114(l)(1).  
 11. Id. at § 114(f)(11). 
 12. The Secretary is responsible for day-to-day federal security screening operations, developing 
standards for hiring security personnel, training security personnel, and providing security personnel at 
all airports in the United States.  Id. at §§ 114(e)(1)-(4). 
 13. Id. at § 114(f)(2).  The Secretary’s duties also include receiving and distributing intelligence 
information related to transportation security, as well as managing security information distributed to 
airports.  Id. at §§ 114(h), (f)(1). 
 14. An order may constitute a regulation or a security directive.  Id. at § 114(l)(2)(A). 
 15. Id.  All emergency regulations are subject to review by the Transportation Security Oversight 
Board and cannot exceed ninety days unless the board ratifies the regulation.  Id. at § 114 (l)(2)(B). 
 16. Id. at §§ 114(h)(1), (2), (3)(A). 
 17. Id. at § 114(h)(2). 
 18. Id. at § 114(h)(3)(A). This section does not give authority to create passenger lists, but assumes 
that they already exist. 
 19. Id. § 114(h)(2).  The Secretary may also require “air carriers to share passenger lists with appro-
priate Federal agencies.” Id. at § 114(h)(4).  
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B. Freedom of Information Documents 
The TSA’s governing statute already assumes that passenger lists exist 
and only regulates how the TSA may distribute and use these lists.20  
Therefore, the primary question is, where do these lists come from?  In 
2002, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) obtained docu-
ments from the TSA through the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).21  
The FOIA documents that EPIC received from the TSA confirmed that 
from 1990 to September 11, 2001, the FAA issued Security Directives 
(“SDs”) and companion Emergency Amendments (“EAs”) identifying 
persons that air carriers could not transport.22  In November 2001, the FAA 
and TSA assumed full administrative responsibility for the lists.23  The 
FAA issued an SD that separated the lists into a No-Fly List and a Selectee 
List.24  The No-Fly List includes persons that are not allowed to board an 
aircraft,25 while the Selectee List includes persons who are subject to addi-
tional security screening prior to boarding an aircraft.26  The FOIA docu-
ments further contained letters from passengers to their respective con-
gressmen.  The passenger complaints confirmed that passengers received 
no prior notification that their name was on one of these lists.27   
C. Longmire Declaration and Ombudsman Clearance Procedures 
The TSA discussed the importance of keeping the lists secret in Green 
v. Transportation Security Administration,28 where passengers on a No-Fly 
List filed suit against the TSA for violation of their Fifth Amendment 
rights.29  The TSA submitted an affidavit from Lee Longmire (“Longmire 
  
 20. Id. at §§ 114(f), (h). 
 21. EPIC filed a FOIA request in October 2002.  When the TSA failed to respond to EPIC’s request, 
EPIC filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in December 2002.  TSA 
subsequently responded, releasing documents in compliance with the FOIA. Electonic Privacy Infor-
mation Center, Memo From Acting Associate Under Secretary (October 16, 2002), 
http://www.epic.org/foia_docs/airtravel/memo-10-16-02.pdf (accessed October 1, 2005) [hereinafter 
Memo From Acting Associate Under Secretary]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
 25. SD-108-01-20 supports the “No-Fly list.”  Id.   
 26. SD-108-01-21 supports the “Selectee list.”  Id.   
 27. Passengers often complain that they have no prior notification that they are on a list.  The first 
time that they receive notification that they are on a list is when they attempt to board an aircraft.  
Congressional letters to the TSA indicate that congressmen do not know where the lists come from or 
how to take the names off of the lists.  Passenger Complaints, supra n. 4, at http://www.epic.org/ 
foia_docs/airtravel/congress1.pdf. 
 28. 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
 29. Id. at 1122.  For a discussion on Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin., review Reputation as a Liberty 
Interest, infra pt. III(B). 
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Declaration”), the Assistant Administrator for Operations Policy, and the 
TSA’s clearance procedures.30 
The Longmire Declaration established that the TSA publishes neither 
the procedures the agency uses for administering the lists nor the selection 
criteria for placing a passenger on the list.31  The TSA argues that publicly 
disclosing the procedures that air carriers follow in administering the lists 
would jeopardize passenger safety because terrorists would be able to iden-
tify weaknesses in the system and circumvent the system’s safeguards.32  
The TSA further argues that publicly disclosing the identity of individuals 
on the list would also jeopardize passenger safety because terrorists would 
learn which of their agents have been identified and which of their agents 
can travel undetected.33  For these security reasons, the TSA does not pub-
licly disclose the No-Fly and the Selectee Lists.34 
The TSA further provides clearance procedures for passengers who 
have their names confused with another name on the list.35  The procedures 
require passengers to submit a Passenger Identity Verification Form 
(“PIVF”) to the Office of the Ombudsman.36  The PIVF allows passengers 
to submit identifying information such as height, weight, or hair color.37  
The TSA will review the PIVF and determine if a passenger has a mistaken 
identity and help expedite the passenger’s check-in process.38 
D. Constitutional Issues 
The No-Fly and the Selectee Lists present multiple constitutional is-
sues that have yet to be settled by the courts.  For example, the additional 
searches required under the Selectee Lists may implicate the Fourth 
Amendment, where detaining an individual for additional screening may 
constitute an unlawful search and seizure.39  Furthermore, airlines use a 
  
 30. Id. at 1122-24. 
 31. Aff. Lee Longmire, ¶ 9 (June 4, 2004), http://secondaryscreening.net/static/docs/legal/2004/ 
longmire%20nofly%20declaration.pdf (accessed on September 29, 2005) [hereinafter Longmire Decla-
ration]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Notice of Filing Expedited No-Fly List and Selectee List Clearance Procedures. Attachment A 
(November 2, 2004), http://hasbrouck.org/documents/nofly/2004-11-02NoticeofFilingforPublic 
Docs.pdf (accessed on October 1, 2005) [hereinafter Clearance Procedures]. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Eric J. Miller, The Cost of Securing Domestic Air Travel, 21 John Marshall J. Computer & 
Info. L. 405, 409-20 (Spring 2003) (discussing Fourth Amendment standards and analyzing whether 
airline security measures in response to 9/11 meet them). 
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computer system,40 which utilizes sophisticated search algorithms, to 
search the passenger lists.41  The use of this computer system may amount 
to an invasion of privacy.42  While these issues have yet to be settled, this 
article will focus on why the No-Fly and the Selectee Lists violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process clause.  More specifically, this article will ex-
plain why the TSA should afford passengers notice and opportunity for a 
hearing before the TSA places them on one of the lists.  
III.  FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution affords the 
right against state action such that “no person shall be . . . deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”43  The Fifth Amendment 
due process clause provides both procedural and substantive due process.44  
Substantive due process concerns the constitutionality of government ac-
tion, while procedural due process concerns the necessity of adequate pro-
cedural safeguards, such as notice and hearing.45  A passenger on a No-Fly 
or a Selectee List may have grounds under substantive due process to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the No-Fly and the Selectee Lists.  However, 
this article will explore whether the procedure of placing a passenger’s 
name on one of the lists without providing the passenger with notice or 
opportunity for a hearing violates the Fifth Amendment’s procedural due 
process requirements.   
Before a court can require the TSA to provide notice and opportunity 
for a hearing prior to placing a passenger on one of the lists, the passenger 
must demonstrate that having his or her name on one of the lists deprives 
him or her of a liberty interest.46  Part A will discuss how placing a passen-
ger on a No-Fly List deprives the passenger of his or her right to interstate 
travel.  Part B will discuss how a passenger on a No-Fly or Selectee List 
deprives the passenger of his or her reputation if the passenger can show 
  
 40. The TSA-enabling Act authorizes the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System II 
(“CAPS II”), a database containing information about passengers.  Deborah von Rochow-Leuschner, 
CAPPS II and the Fourth Amendment: Does it Fly?, 69 J. Air L. & Com. 139, 141 (Winter 2004). 
 41. Id. at 143-46. 
 42. Id. at 146-49. 
 43. U.S. Const. amend. V.  
 44. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 523-24 (2d ed., Aspen Pub-
lishers 2002). 
 45. Id.  An individual seeking to have a government action declared unconstitutional for violating a 
constitutional right is claiming a violation of substantive due process.  Id.  An individual seeking to 
have a government action declared unconstitutional due to lack of notice and opportunity for a hearing 
before a deprivation of liberty is claiming a violation of procedural due process.  Id. 
 46. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due process imposes con-
straints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’. . . interests.”). 
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that having his or her name on one of the lists affects a more tangible inter-
est. 
A. The Right to Interstate Travel as a Liberty Interest 
The right of citizens to travel freely from one state to another is a fun-
damental constitutional right.47  The Court recognizes that the right exists 
even though the text of the United States Constitution does not explicitly 
mention the right to travel.48  In Crandall v. Nevada,49 an 1867 case where 
the Court declared unconstitutional a state law that taxed persons who 
wanted to leave the state or pass through it, the Court recognized the im-
portance of the right to travel.50  Although the Court did not cite a particu-
lar constitutional provision, the Court recognized the right to travel as nec-
essary to carry out the functions of the government.51 
The Court in United States v. Guest affirmed that the right to travel is a 
fundamental constitutional right without referencing a specific constitu-
  
 47. U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). 
 48. Id. 
 49. 73 U.S. 35 (1867). 
 50. Noting that the people of the United States constitute one nation and “have a government in 
which all of them are deeply interested,” the Court stated 
 
[t]hat government has a right to call to this point any or all of its citizens to aid in its ser-
vice, as members of the Congress, of the courts, of the executive departments, and to fill all 
its other offices; and this right cannot be made to depend upon the pleasure of a State over 
whose territory they must pass to reach the point where these services must be rendered.  
The government, also, has its offices of secondary importance in all other parts of the 
country.  On the sea-coasts and on the rivers it has its ports of entry.  In the interior it has 
its land offices, its revenue offices, and its subtreasuries.  In all these it demands the ser-
vices of its citizens, and is entitled to bring them to those points from all quarters of the na-
tion, and no power can exist in a State to obstruct this right that would not enable it to de-
feat the purposes for which the government was established. 
 
Id. at 43-44 (emphasis added).  The Court further recognized that if the right to travel is necessary to 
carry out the functions of government, then citizens inherently have the right to travel: 
 
But if the government has these rights on her own account, the citizen also has correlative 
rights.  He has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have 
upon that government, or to transact any business he may have with it.  To seek its protec-
tion, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions.  He has a right to free ac-
cess to its sea-ports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are 
conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the courts of jus-
tice in the several states, and this right is in its nature independent of the will of any State 
over whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it. 
 
Id. at 44 (emphasis added). 
 51. See id. at 43-44 (no explicit mention of a constitutional provision when discussing the right to 
travel as a necessity of government). 
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tional provision.52  The Guest Court did not find that the right to travel 
came from a specific constitutional provision, but held that the “freedom to 
travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic 
right under the Constitution.”53  Furthermore, the Court held that the con-
stitutional right to travel was broader than the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause neither the government nor private actors can interfere with the citi-
zens’ right to travel.54  More recently, in Saenz v. Roe,55 the Court reaf-
firmed that the right to travel from one state to another was a fundamental 
right without identifying the source of the right in the text of the Constitu-
tion.56 
The right to interstate travel implicates three primary areas: (1) the 
right to travel from one state to another; (2) the right to visit another state 
without being treated differently than the state’s permanent residents; and 
(3) the right to move permanently to another state without being treated 
differently than the state’s permanent residents.57  The second and third 
components primarily apply when a state law imposes a durational resi-
dency restriction.58  Asserting that passengers have a right to fly only im-
plicates the right to travel from one state to another.59 
The Supreme Court has never held that denying the right to air travel 
deprives citizens of their fundamental right to travel.  To invoke the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process procedures, a passenger on a No-Fly List will 
need to show that placement on this list amounts to a deprivation of the 
fundamental right to travel.60  While the No-Fly List deprives a passenger 
  
 52. Id. at 759 (“The constitutional right to travel . . . occupies a position fundamental to the concept 
of our Federal Union.”).  In U.S. v. Guest, six defendants were charged with violating a federal law that 
made it illegal to “conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or 
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution.”  Id. at 746-47.  The defendants 
were accused of intimidating African American citizens by threatening their lives, filing false criminal 
reports against them, and burning crosses.  Id. at 748. 
 53. Id. at 758.  The Court noted that while the Articles of Confederation explicitly provided the right 
for people to travel from state to state, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention the right to 
travel.  Id.  The Court hypothesized that the right to travel was so basic to building a stronger Union 
that it need not be mentioned.  Id. 
 54. Id. at 759 n. 17. 
 55. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 56. Id. at 501. 
 57. Id. at 500.  The Court did not find a specific source for the right to travel from one state to an-
other.  Id. at 501.  The Privileges and Immunities clause of Article IV, § 2 supports the right to visit 
other states without the burdens of alienage.  Id.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immuni-
ties clause supports the right to move to another state without the burdens of alienage.  Id. 
 58. See Kansas v. U.S., 16 F.3d 436, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[C]ourts have seldom . . . encountered . 
. . laws which directly burden interstate travel, but the right has been relied upon . . . to condemn state 
laws that prefer long-time residents or penalize new residents[,] thus indirectly implicating the right to 
travel.”). 
 59. See id. (noting that the right to travel is implicated when the law actually deters travel). 
 60. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (“The right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of 
which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law.”). 
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the ability to fly, the primary challenge facing the passenger is demonstrat-
ing that placement on the list is a deprivation of the right to travel despite 
the availability of other modes of travel.61   
Although the Fifth Circuit held that passengers have no constitutional 
right to the “most convenient form of travel,”62 the court’s holding relies 
on keeping restrictions on interstate travel minor.63  In Houston v. Federal 
Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) 
promulgated a perimeter rule that prohibited nonstop flights between 
Washington National and any airport located more than 1000 miles away.64 
The two primary airports in Washington, D.C., are Washington National 
(“National”), located within the District, and Dulles International (“Dul-
les”), located thirty miles from the District.65  The DOT adopted the pe-
rimeter rule to divert air traffic from the overcrowded National to the un-
derused Dulles airport.66  The Fifth Circuit held that the perimeter rule did 
not bar interstate travel to National because the rule gave passengers the 
choice of nonstop service to Dulles or a slightly longer trip if they wanted 
to land directly at National.67  Although the court held that passengers were 
not entitled to “the most convenient form of travel,”68 the court probably 
reasoned that traveling from Dulles to D.C.,69 or requiring a stopover if the 
passenger wanted to fly directly to National, did not amount to a signifi-
cant burden on interstate travel.70 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that regulations restricting interstate 
flights to certain locations did not bar the right to interstate travel when a 
passenger could fly to the restricted locations from an airport located only 
twelve miles away.71  In Cramer v. Skinner, Congress adopted an amend-
ment that restricted interstate service from Love Field, Texas except to the 
states contiguous to Texas.72  Passengers could still fly to the restricted 
locations from the Dallas Fort Worth (“DFW”) airport, located only twelve 
  
 61. See Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 7 (does not explicitly mention that passengers 
cannot use other modes of transportation). 
 62. Houston v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 63. See id. (The perimeter rule does not bar travelers from flying to National, but merely gives them 
a choice.). 
 64. Id. at 1187. 
 65. Id. at 1186-87. 
 66. Id. at 1187-88. 
 67. Id. at 1192. 
 68. Id. at 1198. 
 69. See id. at 1187 (“Ground transportation to downtown . . . takes approximately forty five min-
utes.”). 
 70. See id. at 1192 (“[T]hose who do not mind a stopover in Chicago, Atlanta, St. Louis, Memphis, 
Pittsburgh, New Orleans, or Charlotte, may take a slightly lengthier trip and arrive at . . . National.”). 
 71. Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1023 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 72. Id. at 1023. 
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miles from Love Field.73  The court reasoned that the amendment did not 
deny passengers of their right to travel because “[m]inor restrictions on 
travel. . . [did] not amount to the denial of [the right to travel].”74 
Furthermore, while the Ninth Circuit held that “burdens on a single 
mode of transportation do not implicate the right to interstate travel,”75 the 
court’s holding relies on the availability of other feasible modes of trans-
portation.76  In Miller v. Reed, the California Department of Motor Vehi-
cles (“DMV”) rejected the petitioner’s application for a renewal of his 
driver’s license because the petitioner refused to give his social security 
number.77  The court reasoned that denying the petitioner a driver’s license 
did not bar his right to interstate travel because the petitioner still had the 
alternative of using public transportation or carpooling with somebody 
else.78 
A court should find that the No-Fly List denies passengers of their fun-
damental right to interstate travel.  The regulations in Houston and Cramer 
were only minor burdens on the right to interstate travel rather than an out-
right bar.79  The No-Fly List is a significant burden on passengers’ right to 
interstate travel because the list is effectively an outright bar to travel to 
other locations.  For example, unlike Cramer, where passengers had the 
option of using another airport to fly to the restricted locations, passengers 
who find out that they are on a No-Fly List cannot travel to another airport 
and board a plane because the listed passengers are barred from boarding 
any commercial flights.80 
Furthermore, although other modes of transportation are technically 
available to passengers on a No-Fly List,81 the No-Fly List effectively bars 
passengers’ right to interstate travel because no other feasible modes of 
transportation are available.  In Miller, denying a motorist the ability to 
drive did not deprive him of his right to interstate travel because the motor-
ist could use other means of ground transportation to travel.82  Further-
  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1031 (Passengers could still fly to the unrestricted locations by using DFW or by purchas-
ing a second ticket at a location within the restricted area.). 
 75. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 76. See id. (“The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation.” 
(quoting Berberian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791, 794 (R.I. 1977))). 
 77. Id. at 1204. 
 78. Id. at 1206. 
 79. Passengers in Houston were not barred from flying to Washington, D.C.  679 F.2d at 1192.  The 
passengers could either fly nonstop to Dulles and commute to Washington, D.C. or fly directly to 
National with a stopover in another city.  Id.  The passengers in Cramer still had the option of flying to 
the restricted locations from DFW.  931 F.2d at 1031. 
 80. Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 7.  
 81. See Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 7 (only mentions that SDs prevent passengers from 
boarding planes). 
 82. See Miller, 176 F.3d at 1206 (noting that public transportation and carpooling are still available). 
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more, if the motorist needed to travel a long distance, the motorist could 
still board a plane.83  Unlike a motorist, who has other feasible modes of 
ground transportation for traveling short distances, airline passengers have 
no other feasible modes of transportation for traveling long distances.  If a 
passenger needs to fly from New York to Los Angeles, the passenger on a 
No-Fly List is stuck in New York unless he or she chooses to make the 
cumbersome journey either by car, bus, or train.  A court should not find 
any of these options feasible due to the amount of time it would take to 
reach long destinations using alternative modes of transportation.84  There-
fore, although passengers do not have a right to a “single mode of transpor-
tation,”85 a court should find that the No-Fly List denies passengers the 
right to interstate travel because the No-Fly List effectively bars all modes 
of transportation. 
A court will probably not find that the Selectee List denies passengers 
of their right to interstate travel because the passengers can still board a 
plane.86  For the Selectee List to constitute a deprivation of the right to 
interstate travel, a court would need to conclude that the additional 
searches are a major restriction on the passengers’ right to interstate 
travel.87  If a court does not find that the Selectee List deprives passengers 
of their right to interstate travel, passengers on the Selectee List will need 
to find another deprivation of a liberty or property interest to invoke the 
Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.  The next section will discuss repu-
tation as a liberty interest for passengers on a No-Fly or a Selectee List.  
B. Reputation as a Liberty Interest 
Damage to one’s reputation may constitute a liberty interest in certain 
circumstances.88  The passengers on a No-Fly or a Selectee List may face 
public humiliation because (1) airport personnel may identify these pas-
sengers as a threat in front of other passengers,89 and (2) passengers that 
are on the Selectee List may be subject to additional searches in front of 
  
 83. See id. (never explicitly mentions that the motorist was barred from boarding a plane). 
 84. Although the Ninth Circuit held that the petitioner did not have a right to drive, the court indi-
cated that denying the petitioner a license did not implicate his right to interstate travel because the 
petitioner had the feasible alternative of traveling by public transportation or carpooling with somebody 
else.  See id. at 1205-06. 
 85. Id. at 1205. 
 86. Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 7 (passenger only subject to additional searches). 
 87. See Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1031 (“Minor restrictions on travel simply do not amount to the denial 
of a fundamental right.”). 
 88. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976) (Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause 
invoked when damage to one’s reputation affects a tangible interest). 
 89. Green, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. 
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other passengers.90  Furthermore, air carriers are allowed to share passen-
ger lists and security information provided by the TSA to other airlines.91  
Because of the stigma that attaches to passengers who are on these lists, 
airlines may be hesitant to provide the same services to these passengers as 
they would to passengers not on the lists.  Therefore, a passenger may 
claim that the No-Fly and Selectee Lists damage their reputation and there-
fore constitute a deprivation of liberty.   
Unfortunately for those passengers who assert reputation as a liberty 
interest, the Supreme Court held in Paul v. Davis that damage to reputation 
by itself does not constitute a deprivation of liberty.92  In Paul, the Court 
held that the “stigma” attached to one’s damaged reputation is not suffi-
cient to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause without 
showing an effect on a more tangible interest.93  The tangible interest that 
the Court referred to is a right recognized under law.94 
In Paul, two police chiefs distributed flyers during the Christmas sea-
son in an attempt to warn local area merchants of potential shoplifters.95  
The plaintiff’s picture appeared on the flyers because he was arrested for 
shoplifting the previous summer.96  The State chose not to prosecute the 
plaintiff, and thus he was never convicted.97  The plaintiff’s employer saw 
the flyer and informed the plaintiff that he would not be fired, but better 
not “find himself in a similar situation in the future.”98  The plaintiff sub-
sequently filed suit challenging that the distribution of the flyer violated his 
right to due process.99   
The primary question the Court answered was whether damage to 
one’s reputation constituted a deprivation of liberty sufficient to invoke the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process procedures.100  The Court first noted 
  
 90. Id. 
 91. 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3)(B). 
 92. 424 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 708. 
 95. Id. at 694-95. 
 96. Id. at 695. 
 97. Id. at 695-96. 
 98. Id. at 696. 
 99. The plaintiff brought suit in the District Court for the Western District for Kentucky.  Id.  The 
plaintiff brought his cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  42 U.S.C. §1983 provides that: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be li-
able to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress . . .  
 
 100. Paul, 424 U.S. at 698. 
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that because the plaintiff alleged damage to his reputation, the complaint 
formed the basis of a classical claim of defamation.101  Affording individu-
als the right to due process when their reputation is damaged would make 
the State liable as a tortfeasor, and the Court declined to expand the scope 
of the due process clause to that extent.102  Therefore, to bring an action-
able claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff needed to assert that the 
State violated a specific constitutional guarantee.103 
The Court held that damage to one’s reputation does not constitute a 
deprivation of liberty sufficient to invoke due process procedures unless 
that damage results in a loss of a constitutional right or a right previously 
held under state law.104  For example, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau105 a 
state law required the names of “public drunkards” to be posted where al-
coholic beverages were purchased or served.106  Constantineau found that 
the posting of the names violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and noted that “[w]here a person’s good name, reputation, 
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to 
him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.”107  In response, 
Paul noted that the posting requirement in Constantineau altered an exist-
ing right under state law – the right to purchase liquor.108  Therefore, Paul 
construed the language in Constantineau, “because what the government is 
doing to him,” to mean that an individual is afforded the procedural safe-
guards of the due process clause when government action deprives that 
individual of a recognized right.109 
  
 101. The Court stated that “[i]mputing criminal behavior to an individual is generally considered 
defamatory per se.” Id. at 697.  Furthermore, the Court recognized that “if the same allegations had 
been made about respondent by a private individual, . . . nothing more than a claim for defamation 
under state law [is available].”  Id. at 698. 
 102. The Court did not want to make actionable wrongs inflicted by government employees that 
would “give rise only to state-law tort claims.”  Id. at 699.  The Court further examined the criminal 
counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to demonstrate that the Fourteenth Amendment does not cover all 
wrongs committed by the government and noted that the statute did not make all torts of state officials 
federal crimes.  Id. at 700.  The criminal provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 made actionable specific acts  
that were done under the color of law and “deprived a person of some right secured by the Constitution 
or laws of the United States.” Id. at 700 (quoting Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945)) (emphasis 
added). 
 103. Id. at 700. In review of its precedent, the Court rejected the argument that a constitutional doc-
trine exists that converts every defamation by a public official into a deprivation of liberty.  Id. at 702. 
 104. Id. at 708.   
 105. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
 106. Id. at 434. 
 107. Id. at 437 (emphasis added). 
 108. 424 U.S. at 708. 
 109. Id. at 708-09.  The Court noted that “stigma” that resulted from the individual’s damaged reputa-
tion was a significant factor in determining the harm that occurred to the individual.  However, the 
Court did not believe that damage to one’s reputation, standing alone, deprived that individual any 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.  Id. at 709. 
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Similarly, Paul noted that in Goss v. Lopez110 a student was entitled to 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural safeguards before she was sus-
pended from school.111  In Goss, a student was suspended after participat-
ing in a protest.112  Paul  recognized that while charges of misconduct 
could seriously damage the student’s reputation, she was entitled to the 
procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment because the state con-
ferred a right to all children to attend school.113  Therefore, like Constan-
tineau, the individual in Goss was afforded the right to due process be-
cause government action deprived her of a right existing under state law.114  
For the plaintiff in Paul, because flyers with his mug shot were merely 
distributed with no adverse effect on a liberty interest, the Court deter-
mined that there was no due process violation.115  Thus, the Court con-
cluded that mere damage to an individual’s reputation did not entitle the 
individual to the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment.116  
An individual on a No-Fly or a Selectee List asserting that the lists 
constitute a deprivation of liberty due to damage to their reputation would 
need to show that the lists impede upon a recognized right.  In Green v. 
Transportation Security Administration, the plaintiffs on a Selectee List 
alleged that they were entitled to due process because the placement on the 
list damaged their reputation.117  The District Court dismissed the plain-
tiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim because the plaintiffs did not 
allege that their placement on the list deprived them of any other right.118  
Therefore, a passenger will not have an actionable claim under the Fifth 
Amendment if the passenger cannot show that placement on one of the lists 
impeded upon a recognized right.119  Passengers might have an actionable 
claim if they can show that they are being treated differently than the gen-
eral traveling public due to list placement.120 
Furthermore, the Court will not find that damage to one’s reputation 
occurs when the State does not publicize information that would cause 
  
 110. 419 U.S. 565 (1975) 
 111. 424 U.S. at 710. 
 112. Id. at 570-71. 
 113. Paul, 424 U.S. at 710. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 696. 
 116. Id. at 711-12. 
 117. 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.  The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that “the government stigma-
tized [them] by identifying them on the No-Fly Lists, and, as a result, plaintiffs were treated as sus-
pected terrorists.”  Id.  
 118. Id. at 1130.  The plaintiffs needed to allege a “tangible harm to their personal or professional 
lives that [was] attributable to their association with the No-Fly List, and which would rise to the level 
of a Constitutional deprivation of a liberty right.”  Id. 
 119. See id.   
 120. See id. (In dismissing the complaint, the District Court noted that the plaintiffs did not allege 
that they “suffered impediments different than the general traveling public.”). 
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harm to one’s reputation.121  For example, in Bishop v. Wood, a police offi-
cer was fired for poor attendance at training sessions and conduct unsuited 
for an officer.122  The fired police officer argued that the reasons for his 
dismissal were false and damaged his reputation.123  The Court explained 
that whether or not the reasons for the officer’s dismissal were false was 
immaterial because the State never publicized those reasons and kept all 
personal conversations with him private.124  Therefore, no damage to the 
police officer’s reputation occurred.125 
A listed passenger might have trouble demonstrating that damage to 
their reputation occurs without the information from the list becoming pub-
lic.  In Green, the plaintiffs alleged that they were publicly associated with 
the No-Fly List when they were identified as people on the list in front of 
co-workers and the general traveling public.126  The District Court did not 
determine whether this allegation constituted a sufficient public disclosure 
because the court dismissed the complaint on other grounds.127  Therefore, 
the courts have not yet decided whether identifying a listed passenger in 
front of the general traveling public constitutes a public disclosure. 
A court may determine that the lists do not damage the passenger’s 
reputation because the government does not publicize the information and 
takes steps to make sure the information does not become public.  For ex-
ample, the TSA requires that airline operators take reasonable steps to 
safeguard sensitive security information (“SSI”) from unauthorized disclo-
sure.128  Furthermore, airport operators are required to restrict the distribu-
tion, disclosure, and availability of SSI.129  Therefore, like Bishop, where 
the plaintiff’s reputation was not harmed because of a lack of public dis-
closure, the measures that the TSA takes to prevent SSI from becoming 
public reduces the chance that a passenger’s reputation will be harmed.   
IV.  DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES 
When the court finds that placement on a No-Fly or Selectee List de-
prives the passenger of a liberty interest, the court will determine (1) if the 
  
 121. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976). 
 122. Id. at 343. 
 123. Id. at 349. 
 124. Id.  
 125. The Court expressed concern that finding that a deprivation of liberty occurred when the officer 
was fired would give rise to a cause of action for every fired employee.  Id. 
 126. 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. 
 127. See id. at 1130 (The District Court never addressed the public disclosure issue dismissing the 
complaint for failure to allege a harm to a tangible interest.). 
 128. 49 C.F.R. 1520.9 (a)(1) (2004). 
 129. 49 C.F.R. 1542.101 (c)(1) (2004). 
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passenger is entitled to a hearing prior to administrative action130 and (2) 
the type of hearing the administration must provide.131  To determine if a 
passenger is entitled to a hearing prior to placement on a No-Fly or Selec-
tee List, the court will need to consider (1) the significance of the private 
interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneously placing a passenger on one of 
the lists, and the probable value of additional procedures; and (3) the 
TSA’s interest in providing additional procedures.132 
Part A will look at the Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. Eldridge de-
cisions, two of the leading cases in modern due process jurisprudence.  Part 
B will set out the three prong Eldridge test to demonstrate why the TSA 
should provide a hearing prior to placing a passenger on one of the lists.  
Part C will discuss Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,133 one of the Court’s first decision 
regarding due process in the post 9/11 era, and how the TSA cannot use the 
threat of terrorism as a reason for not providing an administrative hearing.  
Finally, Part D will look at what type of administrative hearing the TSA 
should provide passengers for the hearing to be constitutionally adequate. 
A. Origins of Modern Due Process – Goldberg & Eldridge 
In Goldberg v. Kelly, New York welfare recipients were denied bene-
fits without prior notice or a hearing.134  In accordance with the then-
current system, welfare recipients would receive notice of the reasons for 
termination at least seven days prior to termination.135  They were then 
allowed to submit a written statement giving reasons why they believed 
their benefits should not be terminated.136  Subsequently, a supervisor hav-
ing a position superior to the official who approved the discontinuance 
would review the recipient’s record and written statement.137  If the agency 
ultimately terminated the recipient’s benefits, the recipient could request a 
post-termination administrative hearing.138  If the recipient did not prevail 
  
 130. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260 (1970). 
 131. Id. at 266-67. 
 132. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 (stating the three prong test). 
 133. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
 134. 397 U.S. at 256. 
 135. Prior to receiving the notice, a caseworker doubting a recipient’s eligibility discussed the issue 
with the recipient.  If the caseworker believed that the recipient was no longer eligible for the benefits, 
the caseworker recommended termination to the supervisor.  If the supervisor concurred, then the 
notification letter was sent to the recipient.  Id. at 258-59. 
 136. Id. at 258. 
 137. Id. at 258-59. 
 138. Id. at 259.  At the post termination hearing, the recipient (1) is afforded an independent state 
hearing officer; (2) can offer oral evidence; (3) confront and cross-examine witnesses against him; and 
(4) have a record made of the proceedings.  Id. at 259-60. 
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at the hearing, then the recipient could seek judicial review of the adminis-
trative decision.139   
The welfare recipients challenged that due process required a hearing 
before the benefits were terminated.140  The Court agreed and further held 
that the fact that there was a constitutionally adequate hearing after the 
termination of benefits was irrelevant.141 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) 
terminated a recipient’s disability benefits without a pre-termination hear-
ing.142  After obtaining relevant medical reports and other information from 
the recipient’s physician, the agency concluded that the recipient was no 
longer disabled.143  The agency informed the recipient of its decision and 
gave him an opportunity to submit additional information to rebut the 
agency.144  Eventually, the agency made its decision final and informed the 
individual that he would have the opportunity for a post-termination hear-
ing.145 
In contrast to Goldberg, the Eldridge Court held that the SSA’s proce-
dures afforded constitutionally adequate due process procedures.146  On its 
face, it would appear that the Court should have come to the same decision 
in Goldberg and Eldridge.  After all, both cases involved a termination of 
benefits that the recipients received based on certain qualifications.  Fur-
thermore, both cases, while offering a post-termination hearing, did not 
provide a pre-termination hearing.  Although Goldberg and Eldridge in-
volved termination of property entitlements, placing a passenger on the 
No-Fly or the Selectee Lists appears analogous to those agency decisions 
because: (1) listed passengers receive no prior warning that they are on the 
lists,147 and (2) listed passengers have no hearing prior to placement on the 
list.148  The Eldridge Court developed a three prong test – commonly re-
ferred to as the Eldridge factors – distinguishing Goldberg.149  Analyzing 
the Eldridge factors will be necessary to determine whether passengers on 
the No-Fly and Selectee Lists are entitled to a hearing prior to placement 
on one of the lists. 
  
 139. Id. at 260. 
 140. Id. at 259. 
 141. Id at 261. 
 142. 424 U.S. at 324. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. The agency informed Eldridge that he could seek reconsideration of the agency’s decision.  
Instead of requesting reconsideration, Eldridge filed suit challenging the constitutional validity of the 
agency’s decision.  Id. at 324-25. 
 146. Id. at 349. 
 147. Passenger Complaints, supra n. 4, at 3, 7; Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 9. 
 148. See 49 U.S.C. § 114 (no explicit mention of hearing prior to placing a passenger on the list). 
 149. 424 U.S. at 335. 
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B. Eldridge Factors 
Historically, the Court has not considered due process as a “technical 
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circum-
stances.”150 Rather, the Court considers due process flexible, “[calling] for 
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”151 The 
three prong balancing test the Eldridge Court developed to determine if a 
due process hearing is required is: 
(1) the private interest affected by government action; 
(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest if due 
process procedures were not used; and 
(3) the government’s interest in using the required procedures.152 
1. The individual’s private interest 
When determining the individual’s private interest, the Court examines 
the severity of the potential loss.153  The Goldberg Court noted that the 
termination of the welfare recipient’s benefits would cause grievous loss 
because welfare entitlements provide the basic means for recipients to sur-
vive.154  Because the welfare recipient has no other means to support them-
selves, his or her situation “becomes immediately desperate” if benefits are 
erroneously taken away.155  Moreover, the Court believed that because the 
recipient would need to “concentrate upon finding the means for daily sub-
sistence,” his ability to challenge the welfare administration was adversely 
affected.156 
In Eldridge, the affected private interest concerned the termination of 
benefits for workers considered no longer disabled.157  The Court noted 
that the potential loss could be as severe as the loss in Goldberg because a 
worker on disability is “unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.”158  
  
 150. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). 
 151. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
 152. 424 U.S. at 335. 
 153. Id. at 341; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63.  In Goldberg, the Court first noted that whether wel-
fare benefits were a privilege or a right was irrelevant.  Continuing, the Court noted that welfare bene-
fits were a statutory entitlement but did not come to a conclusion as to whether they were a right.  The 
Court suggested that welfare entitlements, although not tangible, were more like property rather than 
gratuity.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63 n. 8. 
 154. Id. at 264. “For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, cloth-
ing, housing, and medical care.” Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. 424 U.S. at 336. 
 158. Id. at 341. 
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An employee who remains disabled would not likely be able to find other 
employment to compensate for the termination of his benefits.159  There-
fore, just as welfare recipients rely on their benefits to support themselves, 
disability recipients also rely on their benefits for support while they are 
disabled. 
The Court further recognizes “the severity of depriving a person of the 
means of [his] livelihood.”160  In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loud-
ermill, a security guard lied about a felony conviction on his application.161  
When the education board discovered the false information, the board dis-
missed the security guard without a hearing prior to termination of his po-
sition.162  The Court held that the fired employee had a significant interest 
in retaining his employment and reasoned that even though a fired worker 
could find employment elsewhere, finding other employment would take 
time and be hindered by the “questionable circumstances under which he 
left his previous job.”163  The Court affirmed this position in Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation v. Mallen,164 stating that an employee has an 
interest in continued employment “that ought not be interrupted without 
substantial justification.”165 
A court would most likely determine that private citizens have a sub-
stantial interest in protecting their ability to fly because the right to inter-
state travel is a fundamental liberty.166  With the TSA estimating a volume 
of at least 600 million airline passengers, air travel is an important form of 
travel in today’s society.167  Placement on a No-Fly List effectively elimi-
nates this fundamental right because passengers have no feasible alterna-
tive modes to travel long distances.168  In Goldberg and Eldridge, the Court 
found a significant interest in protecting welfare and disability benefits 
because the recipients of such benefits had no alternative means to com-
pensate for the purpose that the benefit would serve.169  Analogous to the 
recipients in Goldberg and Eldridge, who could not compensate for the 
loss of their benefits, airline passengers have a significant interest in pro-
tecting their ability to fly because alternative modes of transportation – 
  
 159. Id. 
 160. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985). 
 161. Id. at 535. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 543.  
 164. 486 U.S. 230 (1988). 
 165. Id. at 243. 
 166. Supra pt. III(A). 
 167. Clearance Procedures, supra n. 35, at Attachment A. 
 168. Supra pt. III(A). 
 169. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 341 (noting that a recipient on disability is “unable to engage in gain-
ful activity”); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (noting that recipients on welfare rely on their benefits to 
provide the basic means of daily living). 
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bus, train, car, etc. – do not compensate for the purpose of air travel – trav-
eling long distances expediently.  Moreover, restricting the ability to fly 
would hinder employment because passengers could not take business trips 
or complete other tasks of their jobs that require air travel.  Therefore, pas-
sengers on the No-Fly List have a significant interest in protecting their 
ability to fly. 
Passengers on the Selectee List will have a harder time convincing the 
court that they have a significant interest worth protecting because they can 
still board a plane.  Such passengers will most likely need to demonstrate 
that the additional searches that follow placement on the list hinder their 
ability to fly to the point that they have a significant interest in taking their 
name off the list.  The listed passengers may accomplish this goal by dem-
onstrating that the additional procedures damage their reputation and cause 
harm to a tangible interest.170  
2. The risk of erroneous deprivation 
The second Eldridge factor considers the risk of erroneous deprivation 
of the private interest if no hearing is provided.171   
a. The probative value of additional procedures 
The opportunity to provide evidence, probative of whether the admin-
istrative agency should act, can reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation.172  
In Goldberg, the Court held that submitting written statements prior to the 
termination of benefits was an unrealistic option for most recipients be-
cause they “lack[ed] the educational attainment necessary to write effec-
tively and. . . [could not] obtain professional assistance.”173  Instead, the 
Court reasoned that providing recipients the opportunity to present evi-
dence at a pre-termination hearing would be more probative of their status 
because the recipients could communicate more effectively in person with 
a decision maker.174  Therefore, oral presentation of evidence by the wel-
  
 170. Supra pt. III(B). 
 171. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 172. See generally id. at 345 (the use of medical evidence indicated to the SSA whether the recipient 
was still disabled); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268-69 (“The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the 
capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”). 
 173. 397 U.S. at 269. 
 174. See id. (noting that written statements “do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the 
issues the decision maker appears to regard as important”).  The Court further considered the presenta-
tion of the facts by the caseworker to the decision maker as deficient because the caseworker’s job was 
not to present data in an unbiased manner.  Id. 
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fare recipients was necessary for the Court to make an accurate decision on 
the merits.175 
When extrinsic evidence is sufficiently reliable for the agency to make 
a decision, then a pre-termination hearing would provide no probative 
value.176  In Eldridge, the termination of disability benefits was based on 
medical evidence such as the treating physician’s recommendation, X-rays, 
and results of laboratory tests.177  The Court considered these evidentiary 
items to be sufficient to determine the status of the disability recipient 
without the recipient presenting evidence orally.178  Furthermore, the El-
dridge Court noted that current procedural safeguards, such as allowing the 
disability recipient to submit additional evidence to rebut the agency’s de-
termination, reduced the risk of erroneous deprivation.179  Therefore, the 
Court believed that the reliability of the medical evidence in combination 
with these additional safeguards sufficiently reduced the risk of an errone-
ous deprivation.180 
A court should find that the risk of erroneously placing passengers on 
the No-Fly or Selectee Lists is high without providing passengers the op-
portunity to submit evidence to the TSA prior to placement on the list.  
Unlike the agency in Eldridge, where the agency could accurately deter-
mine the disability status of a recipient with medical evidence, the informa-
tion the TSA relies on to place a passenger on one of the lists is not as ac-
curate.  The TSA compiles the lists based on information provided from 
federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies.181  Information from a 
law enforcement agency is not like the advice of a medically trained physi-
cian, supported by X-rays and laboratory tests.  Furthermore, the TSA 
keeps the selection criteria for placing a passenger on one of the lists se-
cret.182   
Therefore, because a court would not know how the TSA creates the 
lists, the court would have no reasonable basis to believe that the risk of 
erroneously placing a passenger on one of the lists is low.  As such, a court 
should find that allowing passengers to submit evidence to the TSA, either 
through written or oral statements, would reduce the risk of erroneously 
listing a passenger.  
  
 175. Id. 
 176. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 345 (indicating that the use of medical evidence supported by X-rays 
and laboratory tests would be more “amenable to written than to oral presentation”). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 345-46. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Clearance Procedures, supra n. 35, at Attachment D. 
 182. Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 9. 
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b. Invoking the discretion of the decision maker 
When the deprivation of an interest requires discretion of the agency 
decision maker, the Court is more likely to find the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation high if the recipient cannot present evidence prior to termina-
tion.183  In Loudermill, where an employee was fired for lying about a con-
viction on his job application, the Court noted that dismissing an employee 
for cause often involved factual disputes.184  Therefore, the employer 
would have to exercise their discretion to make a decision on these factual 
disputes.185  The Court further noted that even if the facts were not in dis-
pute, the employee should have had the opportunity to present the appro-
priate context of the facts – i.e. whether the employee had just cause for his 
action.186  Therefore, the Court held that the decision maker required addi-
tional information from the employee to make an accurate decision.187   
When the decision maker need not exercise his discretion, a court will 
probably not find it necessary for the employee to submit additional evi-
dence.188  For example, in Gilbert v. Homar a police officer was charged 
with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.189  The police depart-
ment suspended the officer without pay and without a hearing prior to the 
suspension.190  The Court noted that under state law, a state employee, 
formally charged with a felony, would be automatically suspended until 
the criminal charges were finally resolved.191  The Court reasoned that be-
cause suspension was mandatory upon the filing of formal charges, the 
police department did not need to exercise any discretion in deciding 
whether to suspend the employee.192  Therefore, a pre-suspension hearing 
was not required because the police officer could not provide any probative 
evidence other than whether he had been formally charged with a felony.193 
In contrast, the TSA must exercise discretion in determining whether 
passengers should be placed on the No-Fly or Selectee Lists, and evidence 
submitted by passengers would be highly probative.  The TSA issues secu-
  
 183. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 933 (1997). 
 189. Id. at 926-927. 
 190. Id. at 927. 
 191. Id. at 933. 
 192. The appellant argued that the State improperly read the statute and that suspensions were not 
mandatory.  Id.  The Court ultimately found that no pre-suspension hearing was required on grounds 
independent of the interpretation of the statute.  Id. at 934.  However, the Court probably would have 
found that no pre-suspension hearing was required if the Court decided to interpret the statute inde-
pendently.  See id. at 933. 
 193. Id.  
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rity directives, which contain the lists, to aircraft operators.194  The TSA 
may issue a security directive if the “[agency] determines that a regulation 
or security directive must be issued immediately.”195 Therefore, unlike 
Gilbert, where a statute required mandatory suspension, the TSA’s deci-
sion to list a passenger is not mandatory and requires the exercise of dis-
cretion.  Because the TSA must exercise discretion before listing a passen-
ger, providing a passenger the opportunity to present additional evidence 
will have probative value.196   
Furthermore, allowing a passenger to explain any facts that the TSA 
relies on before the TSA makes a decision will reduce the risk of erroneous 
deprivation.197  The Loudermill Court reasoned that even if facts about the 
employee were not in dispute, the employee could place the facts in the 
appropriate context to prevent the education board from making an errone-
ous decision.198  Here, evidence from the passenger will most likely have 
probative value, like the evidence from the employee in Loudermill.  The 
TSA relies on information from other law enforcement agencies.199  Be-
cause the TSA will exercise its discretion before deciding to place a pas-
senger on the lists, the agency will need to make an adjudication of the 
information from other agencies.  Therefore, passengers should have the 
opportunity to explain whether this information is accurate.  Moreover, 
even if the facts that the TSA relies on are accurate, a passenger should be 
able to place the facts in their appropriate context to reduce the risk of er-
roneous deprivation.200 
c. Independent adjudication by a third party 
The Court finds the risk of erroneous deprivation less likely when an 
independent third party adjudicates the facts.201  The Court noted in Loud-
ermill that providing a pre-termination hearing served the purpose of de-
termining “whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges 
against the employee are true and support the [termination].”202 In Mallen, 
a federal grand jury indicted a president of a federal bank for making false 
  
 194. Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 7. 
 195. 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 196. See Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 933 (noting that objective criteria decreases the risk of erroneous termi-
nation). 
 197. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 (noting that allowing employee to explain facts would inform 
the decision maker). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Clearance Procedures, supra n. 35, at Attachment D.  
 200. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 (noting that allowing employee to explain facts would inform 
the decision maker). 
 201. Mallen, 486 U.S. at 241, 244. 
 202. 470 U.S. at 545-46. 
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statements.203  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) sus-
pended the bank president without providing him the opportunity to submit 
evidence on his behalf.204  The Court held that the bank president was not 
entitled to submit additional evidence because the grand jury indictment 
supported the suspension.205  The Court reasoned that the grand jury find-
ing provided reasonable grounds that the suspension was not baseless or 
unwarranted.206 
Similarly, the Gilbert Court found that an arrest and formal charges 
provided reasonable grounds for the police department’s actions.207  The 
Court reasoned that because an independent body formally charged the 
police officer, the officer’s suspension was not arbitrary or baseless.208  
Furthermore, the Court noted that formal charges presented an objective 
fact for the police department to make a decision without additional evi-
dence from the police officer.209 
Thus, a court should further find that without providing passengers the 
opportunity to provide additional evidence, the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion is high because no independent third party has adjudicated the facts.  
The Mallen and Gilbert Courts both reasoned that the government action 
was not baseless or unwarranted because the independent adjudication of a 
third party provided reasonable grounds for the government action.210  
Here, the TSA cannot prove that the agency’s actions are not baseless or 
unwarranted because the TSA does not publish its criteria for placing a 
passenger on the No-Fly or Selectee Lists.211 
The TSA only indicates that the agency compiles the lists using infor-
mation from other law enforcement agencies.212  However, information 
from other law enforcement agencies is not an independent adjudication of 
the facts by a third party like a grand jury indictment213 or filing of formal 
charges.214  Therefore, because the TSA does not establish that an inde-
pendent third party adjudicates the facts before the TSA places a passen-
  
 203. 486 U.S. at 236-37.  The appellee was convicted, but the conviction was set aside.  Id. at n. 7.  
The Court noted that the conviction did not make the issue moot because the statute authorized suspen-
sion until the issue was finally resolved.  Id. 
 204. Id. at 238. 
 205. Id. at 241, 244. 
 206. Id. 
 207. 520 U.S. at 933-34. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.; Mallen, 486 U.S. at 241, 244. 
 211. Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 9. 
 212. Clearance Procedures, supra n. 35, at Attachment D. 
 213. See Mallen, 486 U.S. at 241, 244 (indictment established that an independent body believed 
there was probable cause that the bank president committed the crime). 
 214. See Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 933-34 (filing of formal charges by an independent body indicates that 
the suspension was not arbitrary). 
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ger’s name on one of the lists, a court should find that the risk of errone-
ously listing a passenger is high.    
A court should therefore require the TSA to provide a passenger the 
opportunity to present evidence prior to placing the passenger’s name on 
one of the lists.  The risk of erroneously listing passengers is high because 
(1) the TSA would not be able to make an accurate decision independent of 
evidence from the passenger; (2) the TSA must exercise discretion before 
making a decision; and (3) no third party adjudicates the facts independ-
ently of the TSA.  Therefore, any evidence the passenger provides would 
reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation. 
3. Government interest in providing additional procedures 
The third Eldridge factor considers the government’s interest in pro-
viding a hearing.215  The Court is willing to give more weight to the gov-
ernment interest when the state must act quickly or when providing a pre-
termination hearing would be impractical.216  For example, in Gilbert, 
where a police officer was charged with possession of marijuana,217 the 
Court held that the State had a significant interest in immediately suspend-
ing government employees who had been charged with a crime.218  The 
Court reasoned that the State had an interest in removing these employees 
because they “[occupied] positions of great public trust and high public 
visibility.”219  Similarly, in Mallen, the Court held that the FDIC had a sig-
nificant interest in quickly suspending bank officers to protect the interests 
of depositors and to assure the public’s confidence in banking institu-
tions.220  In giving the government interest greater weight than the individ-
ual’s need for a pre-termination hearing, both the Mallen and Gilbert 
courts noted that the government action was not baseless because an inde-
pendent third party had already adjudicated the facts.221 
Providing a hearing before the TSA places a passenger on one of the 
lists would require the TSA to publicly release the passenger’s identity.  
The TSA argues that publicly disclosing the identity of individuals on the 
lists or the criteria used to select passengers would jeopardize public safety 
because terrorists would learn (1) “which one of their agents have been 
  
 215. 424 U.S. at 335. 
 216. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 930. 
 217. Id. at 926-27. 
 218. Id. at 932. 
 219. Id. 
 220. 486 U.S. at 240-41. 
 221. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 933-34 (noting that formal charges had already been filed against the police 
officer); Mallen, 486 U.S. at 241, 244 (noting that a grand jury’s indictment indicated probable cause 
that the bank president committed the crime). 
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compromised,” and (2) “which of their agents may board an aircraft with-
out any form of enhanced security.”222  Despite this government interest, a 
court should find that the passenger’s interest in preventing erroneous or 
arbitrary government action outweighs the TSA’s interest in not holding a 
hearing.  Because the TSA does not publish the criteria for placing passen-
gers on one of the lists, the current system allows the TSA to list passen-
gers without having to prove that the agency has a reasonable basis for its 
decision.223  Granting the TSA a higher interest over the passenger’s inter-
est because the TSA is fighting terrorism would create a loophole where 
any government agency can use terrorism as a cover to act arbitrarily and 
capriciously.224  Therefore, a court should find that the passenger’s interest 
in preventing an erroneous, and possibly arbitrary, deprivation of his right 
to fly outweighs the TSA’s interest in preventing terrorism. 
The Court further considers the administrative burden and other socie-
tal costs that a hearing would impose.225  The Eldridge Court noted that the 
public interest is also served “in conserving scarce fiscal and administra-
tive resources.”226  Although the Eldridge Court did not have an exact fig-
ure for the cost of holding additional hearings, the Court noted that the 
administrative burden of holding pre-termination hearings “would not be 
insubstantial.”227  The Eldridge Court concluded that no pre-termination 
hearing was required for recipients of disability benefits because the fair-
ness of existing procedures allowing the recipient to challenge the govern-
ment’s claim were sufficient.228   
The TSA cannot demonstrate that requiring a hearing prior to placing a 
passenger on one of the lists would be a financial burden on the agency 
because the TSA does not publicly disclose the number of people on the 
lists.229  In Eldridge, the Court was given at least enough information to 
find that the cost of holding pre-termination hearings for all recipients of 
disability benefits “would not be insubstantial.”230  Here, due to the limited 
  
 222. Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 9. 
 223. See id. (criteria and basis for decision are not published for “safety and security” reasons); see 
also Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932 (noting that formal charges had already been filed against the police 
officer); Mallen, 486 U.S. at 244 (noting that a grand jury’s indictment indicated probable cause that 
the bank officer committed the crime). 
 224. See Due Process, Post 9/11, infra pt. IV(D) (discussing the need to preserve liberty during times 
of war). 
 225. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 347. 
 226. Id. at 348. 
 227. Id. at 347. 
 228. Id. at 349.  Current procedures included the recipient’s ability to submit medical evidence to 
prove their disability and a full judicial type post-deprivation hearing where the recipient would receive 
retroactive payments if the disability benefits were erroneously taken away.  Id. at 339, 345-46. 
 229. Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 9. 
 230. 424 U.S. at 347. 
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information the TSA discloses, a court cannot make the same determina-
tion.  Therefore, a court cannot find that the government’s burden in con-
ducting hearings outweighs a passenger’s interest in preventing an errone-
ous deprivation of his right to fly. 
4.  Availability of judicial type post-termination procedures 
In addition to the Eldridge factors, the availability of a full judicial 
type post-termination hearing also influences the Court’s decision to re-
quire a pre-termination.231  A full judicial type post-termination hearing 
was available in both Goldberg and Eldridge.232  The Goldberg Court de-
termined that despite the availability of a judicial type post-termination 
hearing, a pre-termination hearing was required due to the inability of wel-
fare recipients to support themselves while waiting for a hearing.233  The 
Eldridge Court reached a different conclusion, noting that the risk of erro-
neous deprivation was low, and a full judicial type post-termination hear-
ing provided the disability recipient full retroactive payments in the event 
of an erroneous deprivation.234 
The TSA provides no judicial type administrative hearing after placing 
a passenger on the No-Fly or Selectee Lists.235  The TSA only provides a 
minimal clearance procedure through the Office of the Obudsman.236  The 
Obudsman clearance procedure provides no recourse for passengers who 
are on the lists due to erroneous information, because the Passenger Iden-
tity Verification Form (“PIVF”) only allows passengers to submit identify-
ing information.237  The PIVF does not allow passengers to deny or explain 
erroneous information that the TSA may be relying on.238  Therefore, the 
Obudsman clearance procedures do not adequately address a passenger’s 
erroneous deprivation of his right to fly.  Unlike Eldridge, where the pres-
ence of an adequate post-termination hearing influenced the Court to not 
require a pre-termination hearing, in this case the lack of an adequate post-
  
 231. See id. at 349 (taking into account that current procedures were fair because the recipient was 
assured a post-deprivation hearing). 
 232. Id. at 339; Goldberg, 397 U.S at 259-60. 
 233. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264, 266.  
 234. 424 U.S. at 339, 345-46. 
 235. See generally 49 U.S.C. § 114 (no explicit mention of providing hearing). 
 236. Clearance Procedures, supra n. 35, at Attachment A. 
 237. Id.  The identification form allows passengers to submit identifying information such as height, 
weight, hair color, etc.  Id. at Attachment C.  However, the form lacks a section for explaining the 
passenger’s situation.  See id. (no section for explaining the passenger’s situation). 
 238. See id. (no section for explaining the passenger’s situation); Invoking the Discretion of the 
Decision Maker, supra pt. IV(B)(2)(b) (discussing the passenger’s need to place facts in their appropri-
ate context). 
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termination hearing should influence a court to require a pre-termination 
hearing. 
Furthermore, when no post-termination hearing is available, the Court 
is not likely to find resort to the judicial system as an adequate remedy.239  
In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, a shipping clerk was discharged 
allegedly because his short left leg hindered his ability to perform his du-
ties.240  The employee brought a charge of unlawful conduct in front of the 
Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (“Commission”) where 
the Commission was required to hold an evidentiary hearing within 120 
days of filing the complaint.241  By administrative error, the Commission 
failed to hold an evidentiary hearing within 120 days, and the employee’s 
claim was subsequently terminated.242  The employee’s only remedy was 
through a post hoc tort suit.243  The Court reasoned that a tort suit would 
not adequately redress the harm, because lawsuits are lengthy and could 
not fully restore the employee’s property rights.244 
Without a post-termination hearing, a passenger’s only resort is filing a 
lawsuit.  Like Logan, where the Court held that a remedy in a state tort law 
claim would not adequately protect the employee’s property interest be-
cause lawsuits were a lengthy process, a court should hold that a lengthy 
lawsuit would not adequately protect a passenger’s right to interstate 
travel.245  A lawsuit would not provide a passenger with adequate due 
process procedures because while the passenger is waiting for the court to 
adjudicate the lawsuit, the passenger will continue to suffer the harm of an 
erroneous deprivation of his right to interstate travel.246  Therefore, the lack 
of adequate procedures after the TSA deprives a passenger of his or her 
right to interstate travel should influence a court’s decision in requiring a 
hearing prior to placing a passenger’s name on one of the lists. 
  
 239. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436-37 (1982). 
 240. Id. at 426. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 426-27. 
 243. Id. at 436. 
 244. Id. at 436-37. 
 245. See U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. at 758 (finding that the right to interstate travel is fundamental); The 
Right to Interstate Travel as a Liberty Interest, supra pt. III(A) (discussing the lack of feasible alterna-
tive modes of transportation when a passenger cannot fly). 
 246. Cf. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264, 266 (pre-termination hearing required, because welfare recipients 
erroneously deprived of benefits will suffer without recourse while waiting for a post-termination 
hearing). 
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5. The finality of the deprivation 
The Court further considers the “length or finality of the deprivation” 
to determine whether a pre-termination hearing is required.247  When due 
process procedures are required, the procedures are not constitutionally 
adequate unless they provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard.248  
Whether a post-termination hearing, without the opportunity for a pre-
termination hearing, provides a meaningful opportunity to be heard may 
depend on whether the right is terminated or merely suspended.249  
For example, in Loudermill, where an employee was entitled to a hear-
ing prior to termination of his job, the Court determined that “the only 
meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decision maker 
[was] . . . before the termination takes effect.”250 However, in Gilbert and 
Mallen, where a police officer and a bank president were temporarily sus-
pended, the Court found that the suspended employee had a meaningful 
opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decision maker after the suspen-
sion.251  The opportunity to be heard in Gilbert and Mallen was still mean-
ingful after the suspension because the employees in both cases were enti-
tled prompt post-suspension hearings.252  When a suspended employee is 
provided a prompt post-suspension hearing, the suspended employee 
would not suffer as much injury as a terminated employee because the 
prompt hearing minimizes lost income and the suspended employee still 
receives the fringe benefits of employment such as health and life insur-
ance.253  Therefore, because a terminated employee loses the full benefit of 
his or her entitlement, the only meaningful opportunity to be heard would 
be at a pre-termination hearing.254 
Placing a passenger on a No-Fly or Selectee List is equivalent to a ter-
mination of the passengers’ rights, rather than a mere suspension.  The 
TSA does not indicate how long a passenger will stay on a No-Fly or Se-
  
 247. Logan, 455 U.S. at 434. 
 248. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267. 
 249. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 934-35. 
 250. 470 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added). 
 251. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 927, 934-35 (police officer); Mallen, 486 U.S. at 238, 243 (bank president). 
 252. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 935-36 (case was eventually remanded to determine if employee received 
prompt post-suspension hearing); Mallen, 486 U.S. at 235 n. 6, 243 (statutory requirement entitled 
suspended employee to a hearing within thirty days and a decision within sixty days of the hearing).  
Although the employee in Loudermill was entitled to a full post-administrative hearing, there was no 
indication that the employee was entitled to have the hearing within a certain time period.  See 470 U.S. 
at 546-47 (no explicit mention that the post-termination hearing had to be conducted within a certain 
time period). 
 253. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932. 
 254. Id.  
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lectee List.255  Furthermore, a passenger has no statutory entitlement to a 
post-termination hearing like the bank president in Mallen.256  Mallen’s 
suspension was not indefinite because he was statutorily entitled to a post-
suspension hearing within thirty days.257  In contrast, placement on a No-
Fly or Selectee List is more like a termination than a suspension because 
the lack of any statutory entitlement to an administrative hearing makes the 
placement indefinite.   
Furthermore, unlike suspended employees who can still obtain the 
fringe benefits from their jobs, passengers on a No-Fly List will suffer the 
full loss of their right to interstate travel.258  Therefore, a court should find 
that the only meaningful opportunity for passengers to challenge their 
placement on the list would be at a pre-termination hearing.259  A court 
may not find that passengers on a Selectee List will suffer the full loss of 
their right to interstate travel because they are only subject to additional 
searches.  However, even though passengers on a Selectee List may still 
board a plane, a court should still find that subjecting passengers to addi-
tional searches for an indefinite amount of time without the guarantee of a 
post-termination hearing would entitle them to a pre-termination hearing. 
C.  Due Process, Post 9/11 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court examined whether the government 
has a significant interest in not providing a hearing when the government 
action involves preventing terrorism.260  After the 9/11 attacks, Congress 
passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which author-
ized the President to use the necessary force to combat terrorism.261  
Shortly thereafter, the President sent armed forces to Afghanistan to re-
move the Taliban regime.262 
  
 255. See generally Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 8 (no explicit mention of removal proce-
dure, therefore placement on the list is implicitly permanent, unless appealed). 
 256. See Mallen, 486 U.S. at 235 n. 6 (statutory entitlement to a hearing within thirty days of em-
ployment termination); see generally 49 U.S.C. § 114 (no explicit mention of right to administrative 
hearing). 
 257. 486 U.S. at 235 n. 6. 
 258. See Right to Travel as a Liberty Interest, supra pt. III(A) (discussing the lack of feasible alterna-
tive modes of transportation when a passenger cannot fly). 
 259. Compare Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264, 266 (pre-termination hearing required, because welfare 
recipients erroneously deprived of benefits will suffer without recourse while waiting for a post-
termination hearing) with Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932, 934-35 (suspended employee would have a mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard at a post-suspension hearing because the employee could still receive the 
fringe benefits of his employment). 
 260. 124 S. Ct. at 2647. 
 261. Id. at 2635. 
 262. Id. 
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Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen born in Louisiana, resided in 
Afghanistan in 2001.263  Hamdi was captured during a battle against the 
Taliban, initially detained in Afghanistan, and transferred to the United 
States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay.264  The government contended that 
because Hamdi was an enemy combatant, the government had the author-
ity to hold him indefinitely, without formal charges or proceedings, and to 
deny him counsel.265 
Hamdi argued that his inability to challenge his status as an enemy 
combatant violated due process.266  The Court applied the Eldridge factors 
to determine whether Hamdi was entitled to a hearing to challenge his 
status as an enemy combatant.267   The Hamdi Court recognized that during 
times of war, the government has a legitimate interest “in ensuring that 
those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to 
battle against the United States.”268  However, the Court further noted that 
“during our most challenging and uncertain moments . . . we must preserve 
our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”269  
Therefore, the government could not detain Hamdi indefinitely because the 
government interest in fighting terrorism did not outweigh a detainee’s 
interest in challenging his status as an enemy combatant.270  
A court should not find that the government’s interest in combating 
terrorism relieves the government of holding a hearing prior to listing a 
passenger.  A passenger suspected of posing a threat to air travel is equally 
as dangerous as an enemy combatant.  In both situations, the terrorist fly-
ing on a plane or fighting with the enemy against the U.S. poses a serious 
threat to national security.  However, as the Hamdi Court noted, there must 
be a commitment to preserving due process safeguards during times of 
war.271  Therefore, even though an enemy combatant poses a threat to na-
tional security, the need to preserve due process outweighs the govern-
ment’s interest in indefinitely holding prisoners to combat terrorism.  Here, 
a court should find that even though notifying listed passengers may pose a 
threat to air travel, the need to prevent erroneous deprivation and arbitrary 
government action outweighs the government’s interest in preventing ter-
  
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 2635-36. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 2646-48.  The Court first noted that Hamdi had a liberty interest in being free from incar-
ceration.  Id. at 2646.  The Court further noted that there was an “unacceptably high” risk of erroneous 
deprivation.  Id. at 2648. 
 268. Id. at 2647. 
 269. Id. at 2648. 
 270. Id. 
 271. See id. (discussing the need to preserve the commitment to principles at home during times of 
war). 
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rorism.272  Therefore, to satisfy the Fifth Amendment’s procedural due 
process requirements, a court should find that the TSA must provide a 
hearing prior to placing a passenger’s name on the lists. 
D.  Constitutionally Adequate Due Process Procedures  
A hearing for passengers prior to placing their names on one of the 
lists must be constitutionally adequate to meet the Fifth Amendment’s due 
process requirements.273 The minimum requirement of due process is the 
“opportunity to be heard,”274 and the hearing must be “at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.”275  In Loudermill and Goldberg, the Court 
noted that a full judicial type pre-termination hearing was not required 
because the respondents were entitled to a full post-termination administra-
tive review.276 Therefore, the pre-termination hearing served as an initial 
check on the agency action for reasonable grounds.277  
A court may determine that passengers on one of lists are entitled to a 
full pre-termination hearing because the TSA does not provide a post-
termination hearing.278 If passengers are not entitled to a full pre-
termination hearing, the minimum requirements for a constitutionally ade-
quate hearing are: (1) “timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for 
a proposed termination”;279 (2) an opportunity to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses;280 (3) an opportunity to present evidence;281 (4) 
an opportunity to retain counsel;282 (5) a decision based “solely on the legal 
rules and evidence adduced at the hearing”;283 (6) a statement providing the 
reasons for the final decision and the evidence relied on;284 and (7) an im-
partial decisionmaker.285   
  
 272. See The Individual’s Private Interest, supra pt. IV(B)(1) (discussing the effects of an erroneous 
deprivation); Government Interest in Providing Additional Procedures, supra pt. IV(B)(3) (discussing 
the loophole that would be created if the TSA’s interest were considered greater than the passengers’ 
interest, thereby enabling arbitrary government action). 
 273. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68 (discussing requirements for a constitutionally adequate 
hearing). 
 274. Id. at 267 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). 
 275. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
 276. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-67, 269, 270-71. 
 277. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46. 
 278. See id. (full judicial type pre-termination hearing not required because full post-termination 
review was available); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264, 266 (pre-termination hearing required because post-
termination procedures were insufficient). 
 279. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68. 
 280. Id. at 268, 269. 
 281. Id. at 268. 
 282. Id. at 270-71. 
 283. Id. at 271. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
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The TSA provides neither notice nor reasons for placing passengers on 
one of the lists.286  A constitutionally adequate pre-termination hearing 
would require the TSA to provide the reasons for a proposed action to de-
termine if the action is reasonable.287  Passengers will be unable to deny or 
explain erroneous facts unless the TSA provides the information that the 
agency is relying on.288  Furthermore, because the TSA does not offer a 
constitutionally adequate post-termination hearing, a timely and adequate 
notice giving passengers the opportunity to effectively explain erroneous 
facts becomes more critical. 
Without the guarantee of a post-termination hearing, a court should 
find that passengers on the No-Fly and Selectee Lists are entitled to present 
evidence orally at a pre-termination hearing.  In Eldridge, the Court held 
that recipients of disability benefits were not entitled to present oral testi-
mony because the recipients were afforded with a formal post-termination 
hearing, and the agency could determine whether or not a recipient was 
disabled without using evidence from the recipient.289  Here, passengers on 
the lists do not have a post-termination hearing, nor can the TSA accu-
rately determine whether a passenger should be on the list without evi-
dence from the passenger.290  Therefore, to meet the minimal requirements 
of due process, a passenger should be entitled to provide oral testimony at 
a hearing before the passenger’s name is placed on a No-Fly or Selectee 
List.  Even if a court decides that passengers may not present evidence 
orally,291 passengers should be allowed to present evidence in some form 
because any information from the passenger will reduce the risk of errone-
ous deprivation.292 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The TSA’s administration of the No-Fly and Selectee Lists are a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment’s procedural due process requirements.  A 
court should find that the Fifth Amendment’s procedural safeguards afford 
  
 286. Longmire Declaration, supra n. 31, at ¶ 9. 
 287. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46 (pre-termination hearing should be initial check for mistaken 
decisions). 
 288. See Invoking the Discretion of the Decision Maker, supra pt. IV(B)(2)(b) (discussing passen-
gers’ need to place facts in their appropriate context). 
 289. 424 U.S. at 345, 349. 
 290. See The Probative Value of Additional Procedures, supra pt. IV(B)(2)(a) (discussing the infor-
mation used by the TSA to determine whether a passenger should be added to the lists). 
 291. See Mallen, 486 U.S. at 247-48 (no requirement that “oral testimony must be heard in every 
administrative proceeding in which it is tendered”). 
 292. The Probative Value of Additional Procedures, supra pt. IV(B)(2)(a); Invoking the Discretion of 
the Decision Maker, supra pt. IV(B)(2)(b). 
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a passenger a hearing prior to placing the passenger on one of the lists be-
cause: (1) the passenger has a significant interest in preserving his right to 
interstate travel; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation is high without pro-
viding the passenger with an opportunity to explain the facts that the TSA 
is relying on; and (3) the interest in placing a check on government power 
outweighs the government’s interest in fighting terrorism. 
A constitutionally adequate hearing would allow a passenger to submit 
evidence to the TSA, thus allowing the passenger to explain any erroneous 
facts that the TSA relies on.  The risk of the TSA erroneously listing a pas-
senger is high because the TSA relies on information from other agencies 
and then must use its discretion to determine whether a passenger should 
be placed on one of the lists.  Without providing passengers the opportu-
nity to explain the facts in their appropriate context, the TSA may errone-
ously interpret the information and erroneously deprive a passenger of his 
or her rights.   
Despite the government’s interest in fighting terrorism, a court should 
find that the high risk of erroneous deprivation and the interest in placing a 
check on government power outweighs the government’s interest.  Because 
the TSA does not publish its procedures or selection criteria for the lists, 
the court cannot demonstrate that the agency has a reasonable basis for its 
actions.  Although not all of the agency’s actions are unreasonable, allow-
ing the TSA to deprive passengers of their liberty interests without demon-
strating that the agency’s actions are reasonable creates a loophole allow-
ing the government to act arbitrarily and use terrorism as an excuse.  Like 
Hamdi, where the decision demonstrated that the Court is unwilling to al-
low the government to indefinitely detain a citizen under the guise of na-
tional security, a court should find that the TSA cannot act arbitrarily under 
the guise of passenger safety.   
 
